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ABSTRACT 
Petrochemical plants are high risk, high parameter, and high-energy units, with the potential risks of fire, 
explosion and poisoning. The severe accidents at Bhopal, Mexico City, Samton, Brazil, Panipat, Mumbai and 
many others have increased the public awareness of the health, property and environmental risks posed by 
chemical installations. The recent years have seen a convergence of scenario-based Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP) studies, Layer of Protection Analyses (LOPAs), and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) determinations. The 
aim of the research was to study the hazardous scenario identified in the hydrogen unit of petrochemical plant 
and to determine the SIL for ESD system. 20 hazardous scenarios identified by HAZOP study and determined 
by SIL by applying the LOPA method for ESD system, were used to control the hazardous scenarios. KS-1, KS-
2 and KS-3are three ESD systems applied in the hydrogen unit. The maximum SIL determined for ESD system 
was SIL3. Since the rise in SIL can be quite costly for the industry, adding other layers of protection can reduce 
the level of SIL for ESD (SIS). 
Key words: HAZOP study, LOPA, SIL, ESD    
 
INTRODUCTION 
The chemical process industries are characterised 
by the use, processing, and storage of large 
amounts of dangerous chemical substances and/or 
energy [1]. The severe accidents at Bhopal, Mexico 
City, Samton, Brazil, Panipat, Mumbai and many 
others have increased public awareness towards the 
health, property and environmental risk posed by 
chemical installations [2]. Petrochemical plants are 
high risk, high parameter, and high-energy units, 
with the potential risks of fire, explosion and 
poisoning. Intrinsic safety for the petrochemical 
plant is to use technological measures to eliminate 
or control risks and to prevent accidents, as to 
avoid damages and losses [3]. The basic concept 
behind HAZOP studies is that processes work well 
when operating under design conditions. When 
deviations from the process design conditions 
occur, operability problems and accidents can 
occur. The HAZOP study method uses guide words 
to assist the analysis team in considering the causes 
and consequences of deviations. HAZOP (Hazard 
and Operability Study) is a systematic safety study, 
based on the systematic approach toward an 
assessment of safety and operability of complex 
process equipment or the production process [4]. 
Various types of process hazards analyses (PHA) 
are currently in widespread use throughout the 
process industry. The PHA process can be 
supplemented with Layers of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA) to provide an order of magnitude estimate 
of the hazardous event frequency by assessing the 
frequency of the initiating events that lead to the 
hazardous event and the probability that the 
safeguards fail [5]. LOPA is a simplified form of 
risk assessment. LOPA is an analysis tool that 
typically builds on the information developed 
during a qualitative hazard evaluation, such as a 
process hazard analysis [6]. LOPA is one of a 
number of techniques developed in response to a 
requirement within the process industry to be able 
to assess the adequacy of the layers of protection 
provided for an activity [7]. In chemical processes 
several protection layers are used, and in LOPA the 
number and the strength of these protective layers 
are analyzed. LOPA can be considered as a 
simplified form of a quantitative risk assessment. It 
can be used after a hazard and operability analysis 
(HAZOP), and before a quantitative risk analysis 
(QRA). A difference between LOPA and other 
tools is that LOPA analyzes the different protective 
layers individually, and the mitigation they lead to 
[8]. Using a multi-disciplined team, the 
consequences identified in the HAZOP are listed as 
impact events and are classified for severity level. 
The initiating causes are listed for each impact 
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event and likelihood is estimated for each initiating 
cause. Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) are 
listed, including process design, basic process 
control system, alarms and procedures, safe 
instrumental systems, and additional mitigation 
(Figure.1).  
 
 
Fig. 1: .Layers of protection in process industries. 
(CCPS, 2001) 
 
Each IPL is assigned a probability of Failure on 
Demand (PFD) [9]. Recent years have seen a 
convergence of scenario-based Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) studies, Layer of Protection 
Analyses (LOPAs), and safety integrity level (SIL) 
determinations [10]. Safety Instrumented Systems 
(SISs) is commonly used in the process industry, to 
respond to hazardous events. In line with the 
important standard IEC 61508, SISs are generally 
classified into two types: low-demand systems and 
high-demand systems. SIS reliability is quantified 
by the probability of failure on demand (PFD) and 
the frequency of entering a hazardous state that will 
lead to an accident if the situation is not controlled 
by additional barriers [11]. 
 
MTERIALS AND METHODS 
This study is one of risk assessment studies used 
particularly in the petrochemical industry. 
Some methods of risk assessment are limited to 
certain industries and are not applicable in others 
this study uses two techniques of risk assessment, 
HAZOP study to determine the hazardous scenario 
and the Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) to 
determine the SIL required for ESD System (SIS). 
HAZOP study is a risk assessment method that is 
commonly used in process industries to determine 
deviations of normal operations by application of a 
guide word and process parameters. 
 
Guide words+ Parameters = Deviations 
Example: NO/Less + Flow = No/Less Flow 
 
Also, LOPA is a method of risk assessment for 
process industries, which are usually carried out 
after the HAZOP study or before the FTA 
technique. The information required for HAZOP 
study of the process unit includes: 
• Process flow diagram (PFD) 
• Piping & instrument diagram (P&ID) 
• Cause & Effect Chart 
• Plot Plan Diagram 
• Comprehensive Process Description 
• Material & Energy Balance 
This unit has been designed with the following 
headings of ESD system as marked in the P & ID 
drawings: 
1) KS-1: Signal from ESD system (Reformer 
shutdown) 
2) KS-2: Signal from ESD system (PSA shutdown) 
3) KS-3: Signal from ESD system (Startup 
compressor auto start/stop) 
 
Hazardous scenarios were identified from HAZOP 
studies and were used as inputs for the LOPA 
method. This dangerous scenario is expressed as 
deviations in HAZOP studies. In LOPA method, 
the initiating event should be determined for each 
of the hazardous scenarios and constitute the 
equivalent expression for the deviation in the 
HAZOP method. To determine the frequency of 
initiating event in the table series summarized in 
data bases and handbook of equipment process was 
used. These data bases were obtained from 
different references including the Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and OREDA data 
book. Effectiveness of layers of protection is 
expressed as the probability of failure in demand 
time (PFD) and the malfunction of a system is 
defined as the time required.  
Intermediate Event Frequency (IEF) was calculated 
from the following formula: 
 
Intermediate Event Frequency (IEF) = Initiating 
Event Frequency × PFD1 ×PFD2 × … × PFD n 
 
To determine the tolerable frequency the risk 
criteria were used in the following risk matrix 
(Table1). 
Risk reduction factor (RRF) was obtained from the 
following formula and by application of the two 
parameters including the Intermediate Event 
Frequency (IEF) and the tolerable frequency risk 
criteria. 
 
RRF= (Intermediate Event Frequency / 
Tolerable Frequency Criteria) 
 
PFD avg. =1/RRF 
 
SIL for SIS (ESD) was determined from RRF 
calculated by used of table 2. 
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Table 1: LOPA risk matrix 
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Severity of Consequences  
Risk Ranking Description 
L(Low) Acceptable Level of Risk 
M(Medium) ALARP Region 
H(High) Risk not Acceptable 
 
Table2: Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
SIL 
Safety 
integrity 
level 
PFDavg 
Average probability of 
failure on demand per 
years(low demand) 
RRF 
Risk 
Reduction 
Factor 
SIL4 ≥10-5 and <10-4 100000 to 
10000 
SIL3 ≥10-4 and <10-3 10000 to 
1000 
SIL2 ≥10-3 and <10-2 1000 to 
100 
SIL1 ≥10-2 and <10-1 100 to 10 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
In HAZOP studies of PSA, a part of the hydrogen 
unit in the Tower 2001 A was as selected the node 
and the high pressure was examined as the 
deviation (Table3). In this study, the risks of lower 
rupture and explosion in the tower were examined 
and it was proposed to install the PSV on the tower 
to mitigate the high pressure in it. This node was 
chosen as a dangerous scenario and entered the 
LOPA method to evaluate for the Independent 
Protection Layers and to determine the SIL for 
ESD system used to shut down the unit in 
dangerous state (Table4). 
 
Table 3: A typical of HAZOP worksheet 
Node: 20. T2001A Drawings: 10-SFC/20-A1PR-0001 
Type: Tower Equipment ID: 2001A 
Design Conditions/Parameters: ASME Standard design for pressure vessels(11BAR/40C) 
Deviation: 1. High Pressure 
Causes Consequences 
Risk Matrix 
Safeguards Recommendations 
S L RR 
Control valve (PV2504) Fail 1 Fire and 
Explosion 
4 3 12 1.Gas Detector installed  PSV Installed on 50-
P2103 Header Line 
2. Fire proofing the Tower 
2.Tower Rupture 3 3 9 1.same as above 
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Table 4: A typical of LOPA worksheet 
Node: 20. T2001A 
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SIL 3 
needed for 
KS-2 ESD 
but by use 
of the PSV 
installed 
on header 
line,SIL2 
adequate 
for KS-2 
ESD 
 
DISCUSSION 
In HAZOP study of this node, the high pressure 
deviation due to PV2504 failure was studied. This 
pressure controls valve along with the pressure 
transmitter and the logic solver constitute the 
pressure control loop. Consequences of high 
pressure deviation in the tower included tower 
rupture, fire and explosion so, with such 
consequences, level of risk will increases. Existing 
safety system includes a gas detector and fire 
proofing system for high pressure in the tower. 
Existing safeguards to prevent this deviation is low 
and in HAZOP study, installing of PSV 
recommended on the tower. Insufficient 
independent layer of protection for process 
deviations can lead to dangerous scenarios that 
must be considered by the designer in the process 
design [6].The determination of safety integrity 
level by using LOPA, independent layers of 
protection against dangerous scenario could not be 
determined. This hazardous scenario evaluated that 
the basic process control system and F&G system 
used for control and mitigate in consequence event. 
F&G systems are considered of mitigate and 
independent layer in LOPA that can be effective in 
reducing the safety integrity level. In LOPA 
method, the initial event was the pressure control 
loop failure, for which an independent layer of 
protection against dangerous scenario was 
determined. According to evaluation of F&G 
system, this system has no condition of 
independent protection layers. Without sufficient 
IPLs to control and mitigation of hazardous 
scenario, initiating event has led to severe 
consequences, such as release of flammable and 
toxic materials, fires and explosions, and threats to 
human lives, properties and the environment [12]. 
Based on the Intermediate Event Frequency (IEF) 
formula, the value was calculated as 1.0E-01. Risk 
Tolerance Criteria value was equal to 1.00E-04 and 
finally. The SIL3 was determined for the ESD 
system used for high pressure deviation in the 
tower [14]. Lack of independent protection layers 
can reduce the number of IEF and therefor RRF 
increased, As a result, the safety integrity level for 
ESD systems will increases. However, by adding 
layers of protection such as pressure safety valves 
on the tower, IEF amount reduced, As a result of 
the IEF decreased, the safety integrity level reach 
to SIL2. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Risk of fire, explosion and toxic releases in 
petrochemical plant is high. Therefore, risk 
assessment is a requirement in process industries 
and HAZOP study is the common method of 
process risk assessment used by these industries. 
To identify the dangerous scenario of HAZOP 
study, a risk matrix needs to be selected; however 
the deviations are not within the acceptable level of 
risk. For closer examination of the adequacy of the 
existing safety system, the LOPA method, which is 
a semi quantitative technique, was applied. LOPA 
can be used to determine the SIL for SIS. The 
independent protection layers were identified and 
finally, the Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) was 
calculated according to the initiating event 
frequency, the PFD of independent protective 
layers and the tolerance risk criteria, and the 
required SIL for the SIS was determined on the 
basis of RRF (Table4). Since the rise in SIL can be 
quite costly for the industry, adding other layers of 
protection can reduce the level of SIL for ESD 
(SIS). 
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